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Abstract 
The growing interest in social media for legitimate promotion has been accompanied by an increasing 
number of fraudulent reviews. Beyond fraud detection, little is known about what review portals should 
do with fraudulent reviews after detecting them. In this paper, we study how consumers respond to 
potentially fraudulent reviews and how review portals can leverage such knowledge to design better 
fraud management policies. To do so, we combine randomized experiments with statistical learning 
using large-scale archival data from Yelp. Our experiments show that consumers tend to expand the 
variety of their choice set during product search and to increase their trust towards the review portal 
when it displays fraudulent reviews along with non-fraudulent reviews, rather than censor fraudulent 
information. Finally, our archival analysis using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation method allows us 
to design a novel fraud-awareness reputation system that platforms can deploy to better improve 
consumer trust and decision making. 
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Introduction 
“Oh what a tangled web we weave,  
When first we practice to deceive” 
- Sir Walter Scott, 1808, Marmion: A Tale of Flodden Field, 
With over half of the Internet’s population accessing social media sites regularly, online reviews have 
become a major source of information for consumers. Prior work has found significant economic effects 
from online reviews in variety of settings, including the effect of reviews on product sales and purchase 
decisions (e.g., Mayzlin et al. 2012), the effect of rating on restaurant bookings (e.g., Anderson and 
Magruder 2012) and hotel bookings (e.g., Ghose et al. 2012). Organizations are searching for new ways to 
engage more followers via social media and to garner more positive reviews than their competitors.  
However, this increased interest in social media for legitimate promotion has been accompanied by an 
increasing number of fraudulent reviews on major online product search websites, such as Amazon (e.g., 
Jindal et al. 2010),  TripAdvisor (e.g., Mayzlin et al. 2012; Ott et al. 2011), and Yelp (e.g., Luca and Zervas 
2013) as some companies choose to pay for favorable reviews to create an illusion of consumer loyalty and 
customer advocacy on social media sites. A recent report by research firm Gartner estimated that by 2014, 
10% to 15% of all social media reviews are fraudulent (Gartner 2013). 
To improve the credibility of the online reviews, product search engines have started combining 
techniques from text mining and natural language processing (e.g., Jindal and Liu 2008; Ott et al. 2011) 
as well as network-based graphical models (e.g., Akoglu et al. 2013) to detect potentially fraudulent 
reviews on their websites. However, beyond this literature on detecting fraudulent reviews, little is known 
about what review portals and search engines should do with the fake reviews after detecting them. This is 
the subject of our research.  
Currently, most review portals choose to deal with fake reviews by quietly deleting them. However, certain 
review portals like Yelp, go one step further: invalidate suspected fraudulent reviews and make the review 
visible to the public with a notation that it is potentially fraudulent. There is, of course, a natural tension 
between the two approaches: Displaying fraudulent reviews aims to discourage fraud by reducing 
information asymmetry and increasing the reputation risks of being detected. The hope is that the 
expected cost of being caught cheating will outweigh the potential revenue increase associated with a 
small rating increase. However, this approach can be risky for social media platforms because it may 
highlight the prevalence of fraud, and affect consumers’ trust in all reviews.  
We address this managerial challenge by answering the following two questions in our research:  
1. What is the impact of suspected fake reviews on consumer behavior on a website?  
2. Is there a more effective fraud management policy for social media and search engine platforms 
when responding to potentially fake reviews, i.e., to discourage sellers from soliciting fraudulent 
reviews?  
First, we are interested in the impact of the fraudulent reviews. In particular, we want to explore whether 
displaying fraudulent reviews can impact consumers’ behavior, and how they may influence consumers’ 
trust on a review portal. Fraudulent reviews can be viewed as similar to advertisements or persuasion by 
businesses (or their competitors), except that the senders’ true identities and incentives are uncertain 
(Mayzlin et al. 2012). Advertising literature also suggests that high-quality sellers are likely to signal their 
quality through intensive advertising only when advertising costs are significantly high (e.g., Milgrom and 
Roberts 1986; Nelson 1974). In the case of posting fake reviews, the cost is relatively small. As a result, the 
seller loses little by claiming his product quality is high. Given the expected high benefit, a low-quality 
seller may be more motivated to do so compared to a seller who has already established higher quality 
reputation (e.g., Luca and Zervas 2013; Mayzlin et al. 2012). Therefore, a larger portion of fake 
promotional reviews may in fact indicate lower quality of the seller, which in turn may engender mistrust 
among consumers towards the ethics of the seller leading to a lower demand for its products. This theory 
also operates under the assumption that consumers can efficiently discern fraudulent reviews from non-
fraudulent reviews. However, Ott et al. 2011 discuss how consumers find it very hard to differentiate 
between these two kind of reviews just based on textual information. 
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As noted above, theory alone does not conclusively indicate how the presence of fraudulent reviews may 
convey the quality signal, and more importantly how it may influence product demand through its impact 
on consumer beliefs about the product quality. In our paper, we aim to examine these questions from 
empirical and experimental perspectives. We are interested in examining questions such as: How does the 
exposure to fake reviews in parallel with the truthful reviews affect consumer behavior and choice on a 
website? How does the composition of the fake reviews (positive vs. negative) indicate the quality of the 
review portal? Moreover, beyond the direct economic impact on the product demand, it is not clear how 
fake reviews may affect the potential trust of consumers towards the review portal, which may have 
indirect economic impact on both product demand and the review portal in the long run. In our paper, we 
study this effect in the context of fake reviews and whether consumers perceive a portal as more 
trustworthy when the fake reviews are displayed instead of being deleted.  
Finally, we aim to understand what a review portal should do once it identifies a fraudulent review. We 
are interested in answering the following managerial policy questions: Should a review portal inform its 
users about the potential fraud reviews on its platform? Should the review portal display the suspected 
fraud reviews on its platform after detecting them or should it silently delete them? How can review 
portals discourage fraudulent reviews and better convey product quality by taking into account sellers’ 
dishonest behavior?  
To achieve our goals, we combine two randomized user experiments based on a restaurant review portal 
we designed and implemented ourselves, together with archival data analysis using a large-scale dataset 
we collected from Yelp.com containing 283,830 fraudulent and non-fraudulent reviews for 982 
restaurants in San Francisco. Our goals and main findings can be summarized as follows:  
1. The goal of our first randomized experiment is to understand if there is a significant change in user 
behavior when fraudulent reviews are displayed along with the non-fraudulent reviews.  
 
• We find that when fraudulent reviews are displayed along with the non-fraudulent reviews 
users do behave significantly differently in a manner suggestive of higher user engagement. 
Under this condition, users are more likely to expand their choice set during search by 
visiting more restaurants, and spend more time on the review portal. 
• Moreover, we find that consumers are more likely to choose restaurants that have a lower 
historical fraudulent activity when fraud information is displayed to them versus when this 
information is not displayed. This finding suggests that displaying suspected fraudulent 
reviews information could potentially help consumers improve their decision making.   
 
2. The primary aim of the second experiment is to understand the impact of fraudulent reviews on the 
trust that a user places on the review portal. Using techniques from behavioral economics, we conduct 
a second randomized experiment to quantify the user’s trust for website using a betting game.  
 
• From this experiment, we find that displaying fraudulent reviews and providing a summary 
score of potentially fraudulent activities causes users to trust a review portal more than they 
otherwise would.  
 
3. Finally, based on the findings from the two experiments, we propose a design for a novel fraud- 
awareness reputation system. In particular, we collected a dataset from Yelp.com containing 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent reviews over two years among restaurants in San Francisco. We 
propose a Maximum Likelihood Estimation model to estimate the fraud probability of each review 
conditional on the characteristics of textual reviews, reviewers and restaurants. We observe that the 
accuracy of our model increases drastically by adding features pertaining to the reviewers and the 
restaurants when compared to just using textual information. This strengthens our belief that users 
are not likely to be very efficient in identifying fraudulent reviews by just reading the textual 
information. It highlights the importance of having a robust fraud detection model that can combine 
reviewer and restaurant level features for detecting fraud. Estimates from the final model allow us to 
derive a trust score for each product by enforcing a penalty on the detected fraud reviews. The basic 
idea behind our proposed trust score is to incorporate a reputational cost for every fake review. 
Mayzlin et al. 2012 and DellaVigna and La Ferrara 2010 argue how the rate of manipulation is 
affected by the reputation cost of the players involved. Unfortunately, the existing approaches by 
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review portals to dealing with fraud do not include such a penalty. Our model provides an innovative 
way in which review portals can learn from the fraudulent reviews and better manage them to 
increase user engagement and consumer trust.  
 
A summary of our paper’s structure is provided in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1. Summary of Analysis 
Literature Review  
Our online fraud review question relates to four different streams of the literature, spanning multiple 
domains and dealing with different aspects of the problem.  
The first set of papers establish the importance of online reviews and how information sharing about an 
online shopping experience helps increase trust between customers and merchants (Ba and Pavlou 2002; 
Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Dellarocas 2003; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). The second set of papers 
look at the impact of online reviews on consumer behavior, product evaluation and purchase decision 
(e.g., Ahluwalia and Shiv 1997; Chatterjee 2001; Chen and Xie 2008; Kanouse 1984; Lascu and Zinkhan 
1999). Novel techniques have been developed to mine and predict the usefulness and the subjectivity of 
these reviews based on various parameters which provides context to what reviews have the higher 
probability of influencing a customer’s purchase decision (e.g., Ghose et al. 2012; Netzer et al. 2012; 
Yatani et al. 2011 and Archak et al. 2011). However, existing literature does not address fraudulent reviews 
or their impact in consumer’s decision making. In our paper, we focus on the impact of fraudulent reviews 
on a consumer’s behavior on a review portal and identify best strategies for organizations in managing 
fraudulent reviews. 
The second set of papers is predominantly from computer science literature, which has an extensive 
collection of work done in the fraud detection domain (e.g., Jindal and Liu 2008; Lim et al. 2010; 
Mukherjee and Liu 2012; Wu et al. 2010; Yoo and Gretzel 2011). Most of them involve looking at user 
and/or review characteristics, anomalies in posting patterns (Jindal and Liu 2008; Jindal et al. 2010) and 
some use scoring methods (Lim et al. 2010) to look for review spam. In this paper, we propose a 
probabilistic model that robustly identifies fraudulent reviews. We use this model in proposing a trust 
score based system that will help the review portals in conveying their ability to detect fraud and also 
penalize businesses that resort to dishonest practices. There is also some work in the Human Computer 
Interaction(HCI) literature on measuring consumers’ trust while adopting a website (e.g., Jensen et al. 
2000; Riegelsberger et al. 2003; Zheng et al. 2002). This body of literature looks at the question of how to 
identify fraudulent reviews without going to details about their economic or managerial implications. 
Firms are increasingly using sophisticated algorithms from this body of research, especially using 
Machine Learning and Natural Language Processing to identify fraudulent reviews. While this body of 
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literature plays a very important role in the life of a fraudulent review, it does not address what should be 
done once these fraudulent reviews are identified, which is the main focus of our research.  
The third set of papers is particularly important to our problem. These papers look at the economic 
aspects of review fraud manipulation that happens on review platforms like Yelp, Expedia and Trip 
Advisor. For example, the work by Mayzlin et al. 2012 analyzes the impact of a verification mechanism on 
the cost of leaving a fake review in Expedia versus Trip Advisor and the motivation to commit fraud.  Luca 
and Zervas 2013 investigate the motivation for a restaurant to solicit fake reviews. However, these two 
papers look mainly at the antecedents and motivation for businesses to commit fraud. This body of 
research does not look at fraudulent reviews from the consumer’s perspective, nor provide suggestions on 
how to manage fraudulent reviews once the motivation is identified.  
Therefore, our research question fits well in the later stage of a fraudulent review’s life cycle (Stage 3 and 
Stage 4 marked in red in Figure 2) which none of the existing papers have looked at. After identifying 
fraudulent reviews, the responsibility of determining the fate of the fraudulent review lies solely in the 
hands of the review portal. The natural tension between displaying these fraudulent reviews to its 
consumers to earn their trust and not displaying these fraudulent reviews and risking more future 
fraudulent behavior raises an important managerial question which, to the best of our knowledge, none of 
the existing papers have addressed. Our paper is the first to tie the impact of informing users about review 
spam on consumer behavior and trust on the website. We are the first to look into efficient fraud 
management techniques that the websites could apply once fraud reviews are identified not only to 
increase the consumer trust but also to reduce the cognitive burden in processing fraud information. 
Existing systems for fraud management do not have a reputational cost associated with detection. Prior 
work (e.g., Mayzlin et al. 2012 and DellaVigna and La Ferrara 2010) argues that such a system is very 
effective in discouraging future dishonest behavior. In this paper, based on the rich dataset, we finally 
propose a technique to design a score-based metric that would not only help the website to signal its 
effectiveness in keeping fraud reviews at bay, but also enforces a penalty for businesses that resort to 
soliciting fake reviews.  
 
Figure 2. Life Cycle of a Fraudulent Review 
Experiment I - Impact of Displaying Fraudulent Reviews on User 
Behavior  
The majority of review portals choose not to display suspected fraudulent reviews once they are detected. 
These suspected fraudulent reviews are simply removed from the consumers’ purview. One of the main 
reasons to remove fraudulent reviews might be that consumers’ decision making and behavior on a review 
portal is not going to be influenced by fraudulent reviews and therefore showing them the non-fraudulent 
reviews might be enough. We wanted to understand if this hypothesis is true, i.e., do consumers remain 
unaffected by the presence of fraudulent reviews or can we observe any change in their behavior and 
choice by displaying fraudulent reviews. To achieve this, we designed and conducted a randomized 
experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk between February 21, 2014 and March 4, 2014 with 554 subjects.  
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In particular, we wanted to see how displaying fraudulent reviews in review portals performed against 
different baseline approaches including the currently popular “Silent Approach”, in which the portal does 
not mention the measures it takes against fraudulent reviews or even acknowledge the possibility of 
fraudulent reviews. To achieve this, we designed and implemented a restaurant review portal and a 
reservation system using real life data. Besides, we also designed a behavior tracking system to obtain key 
metrics such as time spent on each page, clicks, restaurant pages visited, and activities such as sorting by 
different parameters and finally, the details of what restaurant was chosen by the subject.  
Randomized Experimental Design  
To design our experimental scenarios, we consider three possible actions with which review portals can 
deal with fraudulent reviews from different levels: Filter, Inform, and Display. Review portals can make 
binary decisions at each of the three levels. i.e., on one extreme, a naive review portal does not have a 
fraud detection mechanism (Filter = 0), does not warn users about fraud (Inform = 0) and as a 
consequence of not having a fraud detection mechanism cannot display fraudulent reviews (Display = 0). 
However, most of the review portals today have a fraud detection mechanism and differ mainly in 
whether they choose to Inform and Display the presence of the fraud to the users. Yelp, for example, has 
Filter = 1, Inform = 1 and Display = 1 which puts it on one end of the spectrum. On the other hand, Google 
does have a fraud detection mechanism but does not discuss about the possibility of fraud and thus we 
can assign Fraud = 1, Inform = 0 and Display = 0.  There are some scenarios that are not possible due to 
the dependency among the three actions. For example, a review portal cannot display fraudulent reviews 
if it does not have a fraud detection mechanism in the first place. We exclude such scenarios in our 
experiment. 
Scenario Referred 
as 
Fraud Management Strategy Currently 
Adopted by 
Hypothetical 
A 
Fraud 
Information 
Displayed 
Fraudulent reviews were displayed but 
with a search cost of scrolling to the 
bottom of the page where they are 
linked to a different page 
Yelp No 
B 
Silent 
Approach 
Do not display fraudulent reviews or 
acknowledge the presence of fraud or 
explain to the users the actions at the 
backend 
Google No 
C 
Fraud 
Information 
Displayed 
Prominently 
Display the fraud reviews prominently 
in line with the normal reviews 
- Yes 
D 
Do not filter 
and Inform 
Do not filter at the backend and inform 
users that no filtering was done at the 
backend 
- Yes 
E Filter and 
Inform 
Filter fraud at the backend and inform 
users that filtering was done 
- Yes 
Table 1. Description of Experimental Scenarios 
In summary, given the real world feasibility and the focus of our research, we finalized our experimental 
design with a 5×1 mixed design. For between-subject design, we consider a total of five different 
scenarios. Table 1 illustrates detailed descriptions of each of the scenarios. We implemented each of the 
scenarios as a real-life decision making environment and assigned users randomly into one of the five 
scenarios. For within-subject design, we let each subject conduct two tasks for two different cities to 
control for any potential user-level unobservable and prior knowledge. 
While each of these scenarios is interesting, first we focus on mainly Scenarios A & B, which are the major 
fraud management strategies adopted by the review portals. In Scenario A, fraudulent reviews are marked 
clearly and are provided to the user at the bottom of the review page and the users are free to look at them 
if they want to. This scenario corresponds to the fraud management strategy adopted by Yelp. Scenario B 
is the popular “Silent Approach” where the fraudulent reviews are removed and are not displayed to the 
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users. This scenario is currently used by most of the review portals including Google. 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)-Based User Behavioral Experiments 
The website interface began with instructions about the experiment followed by a main page. The main 
page contained a list of fifty restaurants and a short summary of each restaurant’s ratings, price and total 
number of reviews. This page also had options to sort by price and sort by rating. Once the subject clicked 
on a restaurant, she was taken to the restaurant’s landing page where an elaborate description of the 
restaurant and reviews were present. The restaurant pages changed slightly in design, depending on the 
scenario the user was assigned to. Each user was exposed to only one scenario at a time. 
The behavioral experiments in this paper were conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT has 
been widely used in behavioral experiments and has been accepted in the literature as a standard platform 
to conduct randomized online user experiments. Paolacci et al. 2010 compared the results of standard 
decision making experiments conducted over AMT subjects with subjects from recruited from other 
online platforms and other subjects recruited offline from a university. The results differed only slightly 
quantitatively and did not differ qualitatively. Ipeirotis 2010 and Ghose et al. 2014 have conducted 
detailed user studies and shown that the AMT population is generally representative of the overall U.S. 
Internet population. Birnbaum 2000; Parkes et al. 2012; Suri and Watts 2011 have explored the logical 
consistency in decision making and other techniques to improve quality on AMT.  
Incentive Based Quality Control  
Paying attention to fraudulent reviews is a second level of investigation that happens in real life, only 
when there is a considerable investment at stake. We tackled this issue by informing the subjects that they 
would get a bonus ten times their participation wage if the restaurant they chose was among the top three 
restaurants adjudged by an internal panel unknown to the subjects. We also informed the subjects that 
the best way to get this bonus would be to pay attention and choose a restaurant like they would do in the 
real life. By making this highly incentive compatible, we ensured that the subjects internalized the stake 
and were incentivized enough to optimize their decision like they would in a real life scenario. We also 
told the subjects that the winning restaurants were not necessarily dependent on high ratings and all the 
information that they would need to make a good decision was present on the website.  
Results  
Impact of Displaying Fraudulent Reviews on User Search Behavior  
We analyzed the experimental results at both the user level and the restaurant level. The corresponding 
results are provided in Table 2 and Table 3 (i.e., differences across scenarios that are statistically 
significant are highlighted in bold). 
User Level Metric 
Scenario A 
(Fraud 
Information 
Displayed  
- Yelp) 
 Scenario 
B (Silent 
Approach 
- Google)  
p-
value 
Average Number of Restaurant Pages Visited per User 5.641 4.554 0.068 
Average Clicks per User 7.214 5.256 0.008 
Average Time Spent on a Restaurant Page per User 
(Minutes) 
4.531 3.170 0.029 
Average Fraud/Non-Fraud Ratio of the chosen restaurants 0.125 0.144 0.084 
Table 2. Results from User Level Analysis 
First, we compare the two scenarios that are currently used by the major review portals (i.e., Scenario A − 
Fraud Information Displayed vs. Scenario B − Silent Approach). Interestingly, our results from the user 
level show that users in Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed) visited a significantly higher number of 
restaurants than in Scenario B (Silent Approach), which only filters fraudulent reviews at the backend but 
does not display or acknowledge them. This finding indicates that consumers, in their quest to optimize 
their choices, expand their choice set considerably when the fraudulent reviews are shown. This result is 
intriguing and it seems to suggest that users become more engaged during their decision making 
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processes in Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed). They tend to make their choices more carefully 
and to use their information at hand more rigorously when they are exposed to the suspected fraudulent 
information. This behavioral change can be beneficial to not only the users themselves, but also the 
products being visited, and moreover, the review portals in the long run. When users are exposed to a 
choice set with better variety, they are more likely to locate a product that fits their preferences better 
hence achieving higher satisfaction and consumer surplus (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, Ghose et al. 
2012). This fact can in turn lead to higher revenues for product search engines (Ghose et al. 2014).   
Similarly, at the restaurant level, we find consistent trends. Our results from restaurant level show that 
restaurants visited in Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed), on average attracted significantly higher 
number of visitors than the restaurants visited in Scenario B (Silent Approach) which does not display 
fraudulent review information. This finding provides further support that by displaying fraudulent 
information, review portals may facilitate user engagement by attracting more users to participate in 
product search.  
Restaurant Level Metric  
Scenario 
A(Fraud 
Information 
Displayed  
- Yelp)  
Scenario 
B (Silent 
Approach  
- Google) 
p-
value 
Average Number of  Visitors to Restaurant Page 3.870 3.007 0.077 
Average Number of Activities on Restaurant 
Page 
5.739 3.908 0.032 
Average Clicks on Restaurant Page 7.339 4.511 0.019 
Average Time Spent on a Restaurant page 
(Minutes) 
1.091 0.645 0.037 
Table 3. Results from Restaurant Level Analysis 
Meanwhile, we also noticed a similar trend from both user level and restaurant level analyses that users in 
Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed) on average conducted significantly more clicks and spent more 
time per restaurant landing page than in Scenario B (Silent Approach), which does not display fraud 
reviews. This finding seems to suggest that users do behave differently when fraudulent reviews are 
displayed along with the non-fraudulent reviews. However, more time or activities spent by users may not 
necessarily mean users make better decisions. For example, users may spend more time browsing through 
the website simply because there is additional (fraudulent) information provided in Scenario A (Fraud 
Information Displayed), and they need to incur additional costs in processing such information. 
Therefore, to further examine the impact of displaying fraudulent reviews on user behavior, especially on 
the quality of user decision, we then look into the results of users’ final choices (i.e., restaurants that are 
ultimately chosen by the users). We discuss the finding next. 
Impact of Displaying Fraudulent Reviews on User Choice  
To further examine the impact of displaying fraudulent reviews on user behavior, especially on the quality 
of user decision, we look into the restaurants that are ultimately chosen by the users. Interestingly, we 
found that users in Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed) chose restaurants with a significantly lower 
average fraud/non-fraud ratio than users in Scenario B (Silent Approach). We provided the corresponding 
result in Row 5 in Table 2.  
In our experiment, we knew each restaurant’s history of fraud (like most review portals that have a fraud 
detection mechanism do). In Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed), the users were aware of this 
information while in Scenario B (Silent Approach), the users were not aware of the information. In the 
former case, when fraud information was available, users evaluated a restaurant based on the history of 
fraud, and ended up choosing restaurants with a lower history of fraud. By not displaying the available 
historical fraud information to their users, the review portals are presenting honest businesses and the 
ones that solicit fraudulent reviews as equals before their consumers. Leveling the playing field between 
restaurants that resort to writing fake reviews versus the ones that do not, drastically lowers the 
reputation cost of being caught and does not carry any incentives for staying honest.  
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Discussion  
In addition to comparing the two dominant scenarios that are adopted by most major review portals 
today, we also measured the same metrics in the sites with the other three hypothetical scenarios (i.e., 
Scenario C-Fraud Displayed Prominently in Line with Non-Fraud; Scenario D-Do not Filter and Inform; 
Scenario E-Filter and Inform). We find that Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed) again outperforms 
any other hypothetical scenarios at user level in motivating user engagement by facilitating user search 
and expanding user choice set with a significantly higher variety. We also find similar trend at restaurant 
level that Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed) also outperforms any other hypothetical scenarios in 
attracting significantly more unique visitors on site.  
Overall, our results from Experiment I seem to indicate that filtering the fraud reviews silently at the 
backend is not enough. Instead, informing (warning) users about the potential existence of fraud is more 
effective in facilitating user decision making (regardless of whether the actual filtering is done or not). 
Most importantly, displaying this fraudulent information to users and reducing the information 
asymmetry is most effective. However, there is a key difference in performance depending on how review 
portals choose to display fraud information to their users. We find that displaying the fraud information 
prominently in line with the non-fraudulent reviews may not be best strategy either. In particular, 
Scenario A (Fraud Information Displayed) leads to more activities and more page views per restaurant 
compared to Scenario C (Fraud Displayed Prominently in Line with Non-Fraud). This result is intriguing. 
It suggests although displaying both fraud and non-fraud reviews can help improve user decision making, 
users tend to process these two types of information differently. In particular, users can incur different 
cognitive costs when processing these two types of information. Moreover, mixing them in line with each 
other can add significant information switching costs for the users and lead to a significant increase in the 
cognitive burden to the users. Therefore, our experimental findings indicate that not only displaying the 
fraudulent information is important in improving user decision making on the review portals, but also the 
way they are displayed is critical. In this paper, we propose a novel step into designing a single 
summarized score to help users reduce cognitive costs and process these two different types of 
information more efficiently. 
All the metrics measured in Experiment I provide insights into the behavior of consumers when facing 
review portals with different fraud policies. Beyond the immediate user engagement and choice, a key 
factor that wins the loyalty of the consumers and makes them use a web portal regularly is the level of 
trust that they place on the web portal. Does displaying fraudulent reviews serve as a quality signal for the 
review platform? Do consumers perceive the displayed fraudulent reviews as a measure of efficiency in 
keeping fraudulent reviews at bay? Will any measure of indication that there was some kind of automatic 
filtering done at the backend help to increase the trust that the consumers place on the website? We 
address these questions in second randomized experiment.  
Experiment II – Evaluating the Impact of Trust on Consumer 
Behavior  
The primary objective of this experiment is to understand if displaying fraudulent increases the trust that 
the users place on the review portal. Does displaying fraudulent reviews indicate the review portal’s ability 
to keep the review environment free from fraudulent reviews? We also attempt to study how the trust that 
the consumer places on the review portal change when the website attempts to display fraudulent reviews 
in a way that reduces the cognitive burden required to process the raw fraudulent information. 
The importance of trust in e-commerce has been well documented in the marketing and computer science 
literature (e.g., Castelfranchi and Pedone n.d.; Meziane and Kasiran 2008; Patton and Jøsang 2004; 
Swearingen and Sinha 2001). Most the papers in the marketing literature use surveys to assess 
consumers’ trust (e.g., yes/no or Likert scale responses). While this is an accepted technique, it is difficult 
to translate the amount of trust elicited through a survey into the actual amount of trust that a consumer 
would place in a web portal. Surveys are further limited in their ability to predict a consumer’s trust in a 
system when there is no cost of making a bad decision or when a monetary stake involved.  
This served as a motivation to design our second randomized experiment. We implemented a “trust 
game” to elicit the trust that user places on the review portal. A “trust game” is variety of a social dilemma 
game where the first mover aims to gain something by placing a certain amount of trust on the second 
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mover. The first mover decides on how much to risk based on how much she would gain after the second 
mover makes her move.  
The trust game is a technique is widely used in the Behavioral Economics literature. It evolves from the 
prisoner’s dilemma games (Nash 1950) and the coordination aspect of prisoner’s dilemma games has been 
extensively discussed in prior literature (e.g., Diekmann and Lindenberg 2001). Researchers in HCI have 
widely used coordination games to measure trust in Computer Mediated Communication (Bos et al. 2002; 
Davis et al. 2002; Jensen et al. 2000; Rocco 1998; Zheng et al. 2002). In our setting, the trust game allows 
us to make our subjects financially invest in their decisions, providing a more accurate measure of what 
they would do in their real life decision making process when there is a monetary risk involved in an E-
commerce transaction.  
This set up provides a good representation of the scenarios we are interested in testing. Here the 
consumers of the portal, as first movers, decide whether or not to trust a portal based on the information 
present on the portal. The consumers are placing themselves at risk - in real life of bad services, and in our 
experiment of considerable loss of money if they make a poor choice.  
Randomized Experimental Design  
The main goal of this randomized experiment is to examine the impact of displaying fraudulent reviews 
on user trust towards the review portal. Moreover, our observations from Experiment I show that not only 
displaying the fraudulent reviews is important, but also how the review portals choose to display this 
information is important. Therefore, in Experiment II, we apply a 4 × 2 experimental design. For within-
subject design, again we allow for each subject to conduct tasks for two different cities to control for the 
potential subject-level unobservable. For between-subject design, we wanted to explore how we can 
effectively present the fraud information by focusing on the four scenarios as described in the Table 4. 
In our experiment, we built a website where the subjects were presented with a home page (which we will 
refer to as the “betting page”) that linked to the above four scenarios. The order in which the four 
scenarios were presented was randomized. The only difference between the scenarios was whether the 
scenario linked to fraudulent reviews at the bottom of the page, displayed a score on the restaurant page, 
or both, or neither. All the scenarios displayed non-fraudulent reviews. 
Implementation of Trust Game  
We ran our experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) from June 20 - 22, 2014. 109 subjects from 
the United States participated in the experiment. We paid the subjects a small participating fee and then 
gave the subjects $4 worth of virtual chips that they can use to bet on the sites they trusted the most. Note 
that the average wage for a ten-minute task is $0.80 (Ipeirotis 2010). Therefore $4 is a five-fold increase 
in the potential reward. In the instructions, we informed the workers that their bet should reflect the 
amount of trust they had on the site. Not betting was not an option. In other words, they could divide their 
$4 chips and invest them among the four sites based on how much they trusted each site. Since trust takes 
different meanings, in the instructions, we defined trust based on our context of a restaurant review portal 
as follows:  
“Think of trustworthiness in the real world context - as a site you would believe gives you the best 
information and the one that you would want to use again and again if given the choice.”  
Note that to avoid potential user confirmation bias, we referred to the fraudulent activity summary score 
displayed in Scenarios C and D as a “Review Quality Score”, rather than using the word “trust” directly at 
a restaurant level. Sites displaying the Review Quality Score had a short description of what it meant, 
along with the score. The score that was displayed to the subjects was just the proportion of fraud to non-
fraud reviews scaled to a score between 1 and 5. The main purpose of this score was to see if there was a 
major change in the amount of trust that the users placed on the review portal by displaying a decision 
heuristic. The short description of the review score was adapted from what Yelp uses under its non-
recommended review page.  
Similar to Experiment I, we designed a system that tracked users’ activities throughout the website. In 
this way, we were able to confirm that all 109 subjects opened each of the websites and individual 
restaurant pages that contained the differences, before making their bets. In summary, the experiment 
had the two major scenarios from the previous experiment, one displaying fraudulent reviews along with 
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the non-fraudulent reviews and one displaying just the non-fraudulent reviews. We added the “trust 
score” to the above two scenarios giving us totally four scenarios to work with.1 
Table 4. Description of Scenarios 
Scenario Description Average 
amount of bets 
 A Fraud Information Displayed 0.650 
 B Silent Approach 0.562 
 C Fraud Information and Trust Score Displayed 1.513 
 D Only Trust Score Displayed (Along with Non-
Fraudulent Reviews) 
1.275 
ANOVA significant at .001 level 
Table 5. Comparing Average Bets 
Results  
The results of the randomized experiment are presented in Table 5. A one-way ANOVA table shows that 
there was a statistically significant difference between each of these groups. This implies that subjects did 
evaluate each of these sites differently. They placed bets that were significantly different between the 
groups. This shows that subjects were cognizant of the changes in each of these sites. They related to some 
of the characteristics that they deemed trustworthy and that caused them to trust some sites more than 
others. We also note that if the subjects were indifferent between the options, they would, on average, 
have bet an equal $1 on all sites, which was not the case in our experiment.  
Rather, on average, the subjects placed higher bets on sites that displayed the “Review Quality Score” 
versus other sites. A t-test between Scenario C and the rest of the sites shows that subjects placed more 
bets on the Scenario C, which displayed fraud reviews along with the Review Quality Score. In particular, 
the average bets were statistically significant for sites that contained the Review Quality Score versus 
those that did not. Between the two sites that had the Review Quality Score, subjects placed higher bets on 
the ones that displayed the fraudulent reviews along with the score. A t-test between Scenario A (Fraud 
review information was displayed along with non-fraudulent reviews) and Scenario D (just displaying the 
Review Quality Score along with non-fraudulent reviews) reveals that the subjects placed significantly 
higher bets on the later. Note that Scenario D is equivalent to the silent approach scenario but has the 
trust score displayed to the users.  
                                                             
1  Note that we renamed the trust score to “Review Quality Score” in the experiment to avoid potential user 
confirmation bias. 
Scenario Referred to as Changes in Website 
A 
Fraud Information 
Displayed 
Fraudulent reviews were linked to a separate page and this link 
present at the bottom of the restaurant page containing the non-
fraudulent reviews 
B Silent Approach 
Display only non-fraudulent reviews. Neither display the 
fraudulent reviews nor give any indication that any form of 
filtering was done at the backend  
C 
Fraud Information 
and Trust Score 
Displayed 
Fraudulent reviews were linked to a separate page and this link 
present at the bottom of the restaurant page containing the non-
fraudulent reviews. Summary of fraud in form of a score was 
provided 
D 
Only Trust Score 
Displayed (Along with 
Non-Fraudulent 
Reviews) 
Summary of fraud in form of a score was provided along with the 
non-fraudulent reviews 
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This shows that user display a clear preference for a website that reduces their cognitive burden in 
processing fraud information in form of a score as compared to parsing the raw fraud information from 
the fraudulent reviews. What is also interesting is that the currently popular Silent Approach in Scenario 
B was considered to be the least trust-worthy. If review portals do not display fraudulent reviews fearing 
the loss in trust that the consumers place on the website, our experiment suggests the contrary. By 
displaying the fraudulent reviews and by decreasing the cognitive cost in processing the fraudulent 
reviews, the website actually increases consumers’ trust on the review portal.  
Discussion  
Review portals today aim to help consumers with product evaluation, which can potentially lead to follow-
up purchases. The business model revolves around the consumer trust on the user-generated content. 
Products such as restaurants are experience goods and consumers’ trust in the portal depends on the 
accuracy of the information provided. From Experiment II, it is evident that consumers’ trust in the 
review portal increases when they notice a score that provides a summary of fraudulent activities and the 
quality of the customer reviews.  
Moreover, our subjects trusted sites that displayed the fraudulent reviews along with credibility more than 
sites that just displayed the review trust score (i.e., Review Quality Score). The link to these fraudulent 
reviews was accessible at the bottom of the page. Interestingly, we notice that while most of our subjects 
did not actually open the fraudulent review page, the mere fact that it was accessible to them seemed to 
increase their trust in the site. This shows that such review trust score also serves as a measure of a review 
portal’s efficiency in cleaning out fraudulent reviews. The trust score seems to reassure consumers that 
there is some mechanism at the backend that looks out for fraudulent reviews and keeps the platform’s 
reviews accurate. Our subjects also displayed a clear preference for a platform that provides a summarized 
heuristic and reduces the cognitive burden in understanding fraud compared to a platform that just 
displays all the fraud reviews. 
The other implication of empowering consumers with detailed information about suspected reviews, both 
in the form of reviews and a trust score, is that it creates a system of reputation and increases the cost to 
commit fraud. DellaVigna and La Ferrara 2010 and Mayzlin et al. 2012 argue how a reputational 
mechanism serves as a huge deterrent in committing future fraud. The current practice of weeding out 
fraudulent reviews at the backend does not deter dishonest businesses from writing fraudulent reviews, as 
the reputational costs of being caught are non-existent. This fosters an environment to commit more 
fraud in hopes of getting past the fraud detection mechanism.  
Therefore, the proposed trust score can not only be used to reduce the cognitive burden in processing 
fraud information but also can be considered as a first step in establishing a system of accountability to 
reduce information asymmetry to the users. This score can also be designed in a way to increase the costs 
of dishonesty and prevent businesses from committing fraud. In the next section we discuss how we can 
design such a trust score.         
Designing the Trust Score  
In this section of our paper we suggest a novel method to develop this score. In order to develop the trust 
score we first develop a probabilistic model that robustly detects fraudulent reviews from non-fraudulent 
reviews. Then, we apply this model to develop a trust score that measures the expected unbiased reviewer 
rating by imposing a penalty on potential review fraud. The basic intention is to create a score that takes 
the original rating, which is generally an average over all non-fraudulent reviews, and adjust this rating 
depending on the quantity of fraudulent reviews and the probability that we can attach to every review 
being fraudulent. Therefore, a review portal that already has a fraud detection mechanism in place can 
implement the trust score derived from our model and a review portal that doesn’t have a fraud detection 
mechanism can implement our complete model to detect fraud reviews with good accuracy and also 
display a trust score.  
Model  
Model Setting: Define a review to be a “Positive” review if the rating is greater than 3, and a “Negative” 
review if the rating . For a review i of restaurant j in week t, we observe the following probabilities 
from our data: 
3≤
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• Pr(Positiveij ), Pr(Negativeij ): Probability that restaurant j receives a positive or a negative review i;  
• Pr(Fraudij ): Probability that review  is fraud for restaurant j;  
• Pr(Positiveij |Fraudij ) , Pr(Negativeij | Fraudij ): Conditional on restaurant  receiving a fraud review , 
the probability that the review is positive or negative;  
• Pr(Positiveij | Not _Fraudij ) , Pr(Negativeij | Not _Fraudij ): Conditional on restaurant  receiving a non 
fraud review , the probability that the review is positive or negative;  
Meanwhile, according to the definitions, we know that:  
Pr(Negative
ij
) =1−Pr(Positive
ij
)
Pr(Negative
ij
| Fraud
ij
) =1− Pr(Positive
ij
| Fraud
ij
)
Pr(Negative
ij
| Fraud
ij
) =1− Pr(Positive
ij
| Fraud
ij
)
 
Overall Likelihood: For restaurant , the joint probability of observing a total of   reviews with  out 
of the   reviews being fraud and  out of the   reviews being not fraud, including 
 positive frauds, 
 − 
 negative frauds, 
 positive non-fraud reviews and  − 
 negative non-fraud reviews can 
be written as:  
Pr(N j ,Fj ,Fj
+ )
= Pr(Fraudijt )
i=1
Fjt
∏ ⋅ 1− Pr(Fraudijt ) 
i=1
N jt−Fjt
∏ Pr(Positiveij | Fraudij )
i=1
Fj
+
∏ ⋅
1−Pr(Positiveij | Fraudij ) 
i=1
Fj−Fj
+
∏ ⋅ Pr(Positiveij | Not _Fraudij )
i=1
Fj
+
∏ ⋅ 1− Pr(Positiveij | Not _Fraudij ) 
i=1
Fj−Fj
+
∏
 To understand how different review, restaurant, and user level characteristics may affect this joint 
probability, we further model the individual probabilities as functions of these different factors.  
Modeling Fraud Probability: The probability restaurant j will receive a fraud review i as a function of 
restaurant, review and user characteristics  
Pr(Fraudij ) =α0 +α1Price j + X jβ1 +Tijβ2 + Rijβ3 +εij  
where X is a set of restaurant level characteristics, T is a set of review level characteristics and R is the set 
of reviewer characteristics.  
Modeling the Rating Distribution of Fraud/NonFraud: The conditional probability of a 
restaurant  to receive a positive fraud review and positive truthful review  is 
Pr(Positiveij |Fraudij )= γ0 +γ1Price j + X jφ1 +Tijφ2 +Rijφ3 +υij  
Pr(Positiveij | Not _Fraudij )=ω0 +ω1Price j + X j1µ1 +Tijµ2 + Rij +τ ij  
Note that by definition 	(Postive|Fraud) and 	(Postive|Not_Fraud) are conditional probabilities 
and they are independent from (Fraud) which allows us to estimate our model. We used Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for estimation. 
Designing the Trust Score  
Our goal is to design a trust score that can reveal the quality and truthfulness of the online reviews. Note 
that one unique feature of our proposed trust score is that we treat positive fraud reviews and negative 
fraud reviews differently. More specifically, reviewers who post positive fraud reviews (i.e., promotional 
reviews) and those who post negative fraud reviews (i.e., malicious reviews) are likely to have different 
motivations. We propose to design a novel trust score that can penalize these two types of fraud activities 
differently.  
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• Self-Promotion - When products receive positive fraud (i.e., promotional) reviews we should 
take into account the “probability of dishonesty” as one additional dimension of measuring 
product quality. We aim to increase the risk of “self-promotion.”  
• Bad-Mouth – When products receive negative fraud (i.e., malicious reviews) the focal business 
(i.e., who suffers from the malicious reviews potentially from its competitors) should be 
compensated based on the probability of being bad-mouthed. In other words, we aim to increase 
the risk of maligning other business unfairly. 
To achieve the above goals, we propose a new unbiased rating mechanism by incorporating these 
perspectives of risks from the two different types of fraud reviews. 
1
_ Pr( | )
i N j
j j ij ij i
ij
OverallRating FraudAware OriginalRating Fraud Positive Rating
N
+∈
+= − ∗∑  
1
+ Pr( | )
i N j
ij ij i
ij
Fraud Negative Rating
N
−∈
− ∗∑  
Therefore, the proposed trust score changes the original rating of the restaurant depending on the 
proportion of fraudulent reviews, which is observed, and on the probability with which each review can be 
classified as fraudulent which needs to be calculated. To calculate this, we need to first derive the 
predicted posterior probability of fraud conditional on observing an upcoming review as being positive or 
negative. We can then infer the posterior probabilities as follows:  
Pr(Fraud
ij
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ij
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ij
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When a restaurant receives a new positive or negative review, we are able to predict the probability of the 
review being fraud based on the observed characteristics. Once we have the predicted conditional fraud 
probabilities, we can then leverage them to designing the final score.  
Data  
Our dataset to perform MLE, consists of 283,830 fraud and non-fraud reviews obtained from 982 
restaurants in San Francisco on Yelp.com. Yelp is a useful platform for our purposes because it has a fraud 
detection mechanism in place that marks fraud reviews separately from non-fraud reviews. This dataset 
takes into account all the reviews written after June 2012 up until December 2014. Each observation in 
our dataset is a review. We consider all reviews with a rating greater than 3 stars to be positive, and all 
reviews with a rating less than or equal to 3 stars to be negative. We also indicate whether a review is 
fraud based on the fraud/not-fraud status given by Yelp.com.  
The overall rating of the restaurant is provided as the average over non-fraudulent ratings. We also use 
the historical fraud data of the restaurant in form of the total number of non-fraud reviews written and 
total number of fraud reviews detected in our model. We created a facilities score out of 14 for each 
restaurant looking at the kind amenities that they provide such as Wi-Fi, presence of TV, etc.  
The dataset also contains reviewer level information like number of reviews written, number of friends 
and whether the user had an elite status. From the raw text of the reviews, we extracted review level 
information such as the number of words, number of sentences, nouns, verbs, adjectives, nouns and 
verbs. We also performed sentiment analysis on reviews and extracted the subjectivity on each of the 
reviews. A highly subjective review will have a score of 1 and a highly objective review will have a score of 
zero. A subjective review tends to draw from personal experiences while an objective review tends to be 
unbiased and factual.  
Model Evaluation  
Predictive Performance of the Model 
We use the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve to compare the performance of different 
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models using different subsets of data to account for the potential variation in detecting the empirical 
boundary of fraud. ROC curve is widely used in Computer Science and Machine Learning communities 
(Bradley 1997; Pencina et al. 2008) to understand the performance of binary prediction models when the 
discrimination decision thresholds are varied. The value points on the ROC curves are measured in terms 
of the “True Positive Rate” and the “False Positive Rate. The top left corner (i.e. the (0,1) point in the 
graph) denotes perfect classification. The diagonal indicated by the dotted line denotes a random guess 
model. Intuitively, the closer a point is located to the top left corner, the higher is the corresponding 
model performance. In our case, True Negative refers to non-fraud reviews identified correctly as non-
fraud and False Positive refers to non-fraud reviews incorrectly identified as fraud.  
Figure 3 shows the ROC curves of different models using different subsets of data. The solid black line in 
Figure 3 illustrates the ROC curve of our main MLE model. We found that our proposed MLE model with 
the entire restaurant, user and review features showed an accuracy of 75% with an 84% true positive rate 
and a 27% false positive rate at the 0.5 decision threshold. Interestingly, the ROC curve indicates that our 
model performs best when the decision threshold shifts to 0.47, leading to an 86% true positive rate and a 
30% false positive rate.  
In addition, to explore how different levels of features may affect the predictive performance, we 
considered similar models with different sets of features in Figure 3. In particular, we tried three different 
models: 1) MLE model but with only restaurant related features; 2) MLE model but with only review 
related features; 3) MLE model but with only user related features. For 1 and 2, we found that the overall 
accuracy decreases dramatically (as illustrated in Figure 3 by the long dash and dotted lines). Model 3 (as 
indicated by the dot-dash line in Figure 3) performs almost as well as our original MLE model with all the 
features, which indicates that most of the predictive power of the model comes from the user level 
features of the model.  
 
Figure 3. Model Comparison Using Different Levels of Data 
To evaluate the robustness of our model prediction, we also compared our results with several popular 
models used in Machine Learning using both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. We found a 
significant improvement in the accuracy of prediction between our model and that of Naıve Bayes. 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is one of the most widely used Machine Learning models and performs 
very well even on data that is not linearly separable. We found a negligible difference in the accuracy of 
prediction between our model and that of an SVM. There was also a negligible difference in accuracy 
between our model and that of Decision Trees. These findings indicate that our model is robust to over 
fitting, and can be potentially generalized to other settings.  
Discussion  
We emphasize that our observational data analysis aims to propose a novel approach of leveraging the 
predicted fraud probability as an intermediate stage towards designing a final “trust score” that reflects 
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the quality and truthfulness of online reviews. All our results were obtained based on the publicly 
observable characteristics of restaurants, reviews and users on Yelp. Review portals can usually access 
even richer information at the backend and therefore the prediction accuracy using our model should be 
considered only as a lower bound. Recent work (e.g., Liu 2010 and Mukherjee and Liu 2012) suggests that 
the prediction of fraud can be improved greatly by observing group spam characteristics. These include 
reviews written from similar IPs, the propensity to write multiple reviews by the same user on various 
restaurants in a suspiciously short time frame or an unexpectedly high number of similar reviews for a 
restaurant in a short time frame are potentially important features in distinguishing fraud reviews from 
non-fraudulent ones. These can be easily added as extra features in our model. 
Conclusions and Implications  
In this paper, we combine randomized user experiments and observational data analysis using statistical 
learning method to understand the best strategy in dealing with fraudulent reviews after they are 
detected. Our final results allow us to design a novel trust score that can be displayed on the review portal 
summarizing the history of fraudulent activities. This trust score can reveal the quality and truthfulness of 
online reviews.  
Our main findings are the following: 1) Our experimental results show that by displaying fraudulent 
review information on review portals, the users tend to click more, engage more, and demonstrate a 
higher trust towards the review portal. Interestingly, we find that instead of mixing the fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent reviews in line with each other for display, it is more efficient to display them on separate 
pages along with an overall adjusted rating that corrects for bias from the potentially fraudulent reviews. 
It is critical for review portals to not only display the fraudulent information but also display it in an 
effective way to reduce consumer cognitive cost. 2) We observe that by displaying fraudulent reviews, 
users tend to choose those restaurants that have a lower historical fraud probability. In our observational 
data analysis, we find that this historical information of higher fraud to non-fraud ratio is a strong 
indicator of a restaurant’s tendency to commit fraud in the future. Therefore, by not displaying this 
information, review portals endanger their users in making a sub-optimal decision. Also, by not 
displaying fraudulent reviews, the review portals essentially level out the playing field and thereby lower 
the cost of committing fraud. 3) Finally, we find that users trust a review portal more when it displays a 
summary heuristic of fraudulent activities in the form of a trust score. Therefore, we propose to design a 
novel trust score that can decrease the cognitive burden and also penalize the two fraud activities 
differently. In summary, our results show that the optimal strategy for a review portal in dealing with 
fraudulent reviews is not only to detect them but also to display these reviews to users. These reviews 
should be displayed in a way that it reduces the cognitive burden involved in processing the information. 
Though our study focused on restaurants, we expect that our results will hold in high-risk settings like 
health care and is an area for future research. Displaying fraudulent reviews will also raise awareness in 
this age of increasing cybercrime and will caution people not to make high cost decisions based only upon 
reviews. The onus on the review portal is not just in creating robust fraud detection mechanisms, but 
more importantly, in displaying this information to its users in the form of a simplified heuristic. The 
model that we proposed in this paper is one such mechanism that will not only detect fraudulent reviews 
but also help in creating a trust score.  
Finally, we note that our analysis has several limitations. First, our experiments were conducted on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). While the behavioral research literature (Birnbaum 2000; Paolacci et 
al. 2010; Parkes et al. 2012; Suri and Watts 2011) has consistently shown that experiments conducted on 
AMT provide equivalent results to the experiments conducted in a lab, ideally we should have been able to 
observe real users in a real-world setting. While randomization of the experiments helps reduce the 
concern of heterogeneity and selection, as in any experimental work, it is difficult to evaluate how users 
would behave under real world conditions and what they would perceive as the inherent risk in making a 
bad decision while looking at reviews. Second, we acknowledge that that trust is not a one-dimensional 
quantity and in our experiment we only considered the setting where the reviewer has no prior knowledge 
about the portal. Excluding these limitations, we believe that our paper helps future research by helping 
technology-based companies better understand dynamics of the cat-and-mouse game of online fraudulent 
information.  
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